






Given the growing prominence of nudge economics both within and beyond the acad-
emy, it is a timely moment to reassess the philosophical and political arguments that sit
at its core, and in particular what Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein call libertarian
paternalism. The first half of this paper provides a detailed account of the main features
of this form of paternalism, before moving, in the second half, to a critical evaluation of
the nudge agenda that questions, among other things, the gendered basis of paternal-
istic governance; the idea of ‘nudging for good’; and the political values that underpin
nudge. The final section of this paper builds on the existing work of John McMahon by
asking whether libertarian paternalism should be understood as a new, hybrid form of
neoliberalism, or, rather, as a post-neoliberal form of governance that has emerged out
of, and flourished in, the post-crisis situation.
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In 2008, at the very point at which the global financial crisis unfolded,
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein published their landmark book
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness. The
success of this book, which has now sold over 1.5 million copies, was not
unconnected to the timing of its publication, for as financial markets
entered a state of all-out panic, Nudge insisted that we should move
away from models of markets made up of fully rational actors and
towards an understanding of humans as beings that, by nature, are
prone to making mistakes. The arguments of Nudge were not altogether
new, as they built on previous attempts by figures such as Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky to apply insights from behavioural psych-
ology to the field of economics (see Thaler, 2015, for a detailed account).
What was new, however, was that Nudge presented and applied these
insights in ways that could be understood both by policy makers and lay
readers, while at the same time advancing an intellectual critique of
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neoclassical ideas of market equilibrium and the homo economicus. Not
surprisingly, Nudge attracted extensive critical scrutiny from across the
social sciences (see, for example, John et al., 2009; Anderson, 2010; Jones
et al, 2013; Leggett, 2014) in the immediate years following its publica-
tion, but since this early wave of interest the intellectual status and gov-
ernmental influence of nudge economics have grown markedly. In 2017,
Thaler won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, and in 2018 Sunstein
was awarded the prestigious Holberg Prize by the Norwegian govern-
ment. Meanwhile, on the ground, the flagship UK Behavioural Insights
Team, which was championed at its outset by the then Prime Minister,
David Cameron, and advised by Thaler (see Thaler, 2015: 330–45;
Halpern, 2015), has expanded from a team of seven people based in
the Cabinet Office to a ‘global social purpose company’ that has
worked on 750 projects worldwide and has trained 20,000 civil servants
and practitioners in ‘behavioural insights’ of different kinds (see https://
www.bi.team/about-us/).
Over the past decade, nudge economics has moved from strength to
strength, both within the academy and policy circles, leading David
Halpern, Chief Executive of the Behavioural Insights Team, to declare
triumphantly: ‘one thing is for sure: nudging – the use of behavioural
insights and the experimental methods it has brought in its wake – are
here to stay’ (2015: 351). This prediction has thus far proved to be cor-
rect, as in the UK a number of prominent behavioural scientists, includ-
ing Halpern, have become members of the Scientific Advisory Group for
Emergencies (SAGE): the body to have provided ‘scientific and technical
advice’ to aid government decision-making through the current Covid-19
crisis. Indeed, in the UK ‘behavioural insights’ have been central to the
government’s response to this crisis: from the idea of herd immunity
advanced by Halpern (which was initially adopted but soon dropped
by the government) through to practical nudges designed to encourage
mask-wearing and effective hand-washing (see https://www.bi.team/our-
work/covid-19/). Nudging, it seems, is not only here to stay, as Halpern
predicted, but is becoming increasingly prominent as both a theory and
technique of governance.
Given this, it is a timely moment to reassess the philosophical and
political commitments that sit at the core of nudge theory. While, at
first sight, the growing prominence of behavioural economics might
seem far removed from the concern of this special issue – post-neoliberal-
ism – this is not the case, as the success of Nudge is underpinned by an
argument for a particular type of political-economic governance that
works out of but also beyond existing forms of neoliberal reason (see
McMahon, 2015): what Thaler and Sunstein call libertarian paternalism.
This article will look critically at this form of paternalism, the details of
which have been rearticulated and refined by Thaler (2015) and Sunstein
(2014, 2019a) many times since the publication of Nudge; something that
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has been neglected in existing analyses of nudge economics in favour of
assessment of different behavioural policy interventions (notable excep-
tions are Pykett, 2012; Brown, 2012; Curchin, 2016; Hansen, 2016). With
this aim, the first half of this paper provides an outline of Thaler and
Sunstein’s conception of libertarian paternalism, before moving, in the
second half, to a critical evaluation of the nudge agenda that will ques-
tion, among other things, the gendered basis of paternalistic governance;
the idea of ‘nudging for good’; and the political values that underpin
Nudge. The final section of this paper, in keeping with the broader aims
of this special issue, will build on the work of McMahon (2015) by
arguing that libertarian paternalism is a new, hybrid form of neoliberal-
ism, rather than something that might be termed ‘post-neoliberal’; one
that departs, in important respects, from Austrian, German and North
American trajectories of neoliberal reason while, at the same time,
developing and extending these in new ways by addressing the ‘internal-
ities’ of consumer behaviour that cannot be disciplined and corrected by
raw market forces.
What is Libertarian Paternalism?
At the heart of the nudge agenda is an ideal of soft governance that seems
contradictory in basis: libertarian paternalism. This term, which was ori-
ginally to be the title of the book Nudge (Thaler, 2015: 324), was first
articulated by Thaler and Sunstein in a paper published in 2003, in which
they argue for a form of soft paternalism that operates without coercion
and which seeks to influence individuals to make better consumer and
lifestyle choices rather than, in the spirit of harder forms of state pater-
nalism, restrict the range of choices on offer. The idea is that libertarian-
ism and paternalism can be combined in order to correct the deficiencies
that, for Thaler and Sunstein, are inherent in both. For, on one hand,
hard paternalism is said to impinge on individual freedom of choice,
while, on the other, raw libertarianism assumes that individual con-
sumers are rational creatures that are able to act in their own best inter-
ests. Thaler and Sunstein argue instead that humans are not ‘econs’ (see
Thaler, 2015: 348) and do not act like the idealized subject of homo
economicus as they are afflicted by behavioural biases of different kinds
(overreaction, lack of self-control, over-confidence, guilt, to name but a
few; see Thaler, 2015), and so may not be able to make optimal choices
from which they will benefit. For this reason, a form of soft paternalism
is needed to improve the choices made by individuals without coercing
them to act against their will. To this end, Thaler and Sunstein argue that
experts with an understanding of behavioural science can gently ‘nudge’
people to make choices that will improve their lives in ways that do not
restrict the freedoms of those involved. They write: ‘Because people are
humans not econs. . . they make predictable errors. If we can anticipate
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those errors, we can devise policies that will reduce the error rate’
(Thaler, 2015: 325). And in an earlier paper: ‘Our goal. . . [is]. . . to
defend libertarian paternalism, an approach that preserves freedom of
choice but that authorizes both private and public institutions to steer
people in directions that will promote their welfare’ (Thaler and Sunstein,
2003: 179). On this basis, Thaler and Sunstein argue that libertarianism
and paternalism are ‘far more attractive together than alone’ (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008: 5). For by improving the architecture of choice (soft
paternalism), rather than restricting choice through state-imposed man-
dates and bans (hard paternalism), they argue that individuals can be
empowered to make better choices for themselves, thereby limiting the
extent and reach of government and state-based forms of coercion (in
keeping with a libertarian ethos).
In the introduction to Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein articulate this vision
of libertarian paternalism in further detail, and, in particular, attempt to
defend their position against libertarian critics who might argue that any
form of paternalism, no matter how soft it be, inevitably introduces elem-
ents of coercion and control that restrict individual freedoms. Against this
charge, they cite Milton Friedman, and argue not only that people should
be ‘free to choose’, but also that freedom can be enhanced rather than
restricted by altering the structure of choice to benefit the chooser. They
are vocal on this point: ‘Libertarian paternalists want to make it easy for
people to go their own way; they do not want to burden those who want to
exercise their freedom’ (2008: 5). They argue that ‘choice architects’ can
help individuals go their own way by nudging them to make choices that
will make their lives ‘longer, happier, and better’, and that the value of
these choices, ultimately, is to be judged not by the experts who do the
nudging but by individuals who are the recipients of the nudge. They add
that nudging tends to involve modest interventions, including setting
default options for consumers in order to make choice easier (see, for
example, Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 14), if indeed choice subsequently
remains necessary. Thaler and Sunstein anticipate that this could alarm
more traditional libertarians who loathe placing trust in government offi-
cials, bureaucrats and experts, on the grounds that this can empower them
to act in their own interests. In response, Thaler and Sunstein state that ‘we
share these concerns’, and, because of this, ‘we emphatically agree that for
government, the risks of mistake, bias, and overreaching are real and some-
times serious’. But this concern, they say, bolsters rather than detracts from
their brand of libertarian paternalism: ‘We favour nudges over commands,
requirements, and prohibitions in part for that reason’ (2008: 11). They
argue that nudge economics safeguards against government coercion
because it works by preserving individual freedom of choice (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008: 12), and, more than this, it can enhance such freedom by
enabling individuals to navigate life-choices in ways that will bring greater
benefits to themselves (Sunstein, 2019: 1–10).
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While the arguments of Nudge have been celebrated in some circles as
being ‘groundbreaking’ (Brown, 2014), Thaler and Sunstein are not alone
in seeking to reinvent paternalism as a form of contemporary govern-
ance. Through the 1990s, Lawrence Mead – one of the most prominent
neo-conservative commentators on questions of welfare and poverty –
laid the grounds of a ‘new’ paternalism that was intended to control the
lives of the poor (see Mead, 1997: 6). Mead’s work is important because
he was the figure to reintroduce the idea of paternalism into mainstream
US and then UK politics through this period (his work, for example, was
of interest to the Institute of Economic Affairs, which published an edited
collection, From Welfare to Work, which had the subtitle Lessons from
America; see Mead et al., 1997). It is, as Curchin (2016) suggests, instruct-
ive to compare Mead’s work to that of Thaler and Sunstein, as it is
against the backdrop of his ‘new’ paternalism that their brand of liber-
tarian paternalism can be considered something new. While neither
Thaler nor Sunstein reference Mead in their major writings, Mead, for
his part, wrote an early review of Nudge, through the course of which he
is critical of their ‘libertarian’ commitment to turn welfare ‘obligations’
into individual ‘choices’ (see Mead, 2009). It is useful to turn back to
Mead’s work to consider the type of paternalism against which Nudge is
positioned, even if implicitly, and to address the political values that
underpin Thaler and Sunstein’s commitment to a libertarian alternative.
The obvious place to start is Mead’s edited collection The New
Paternalism, at the outset of which paternalism is defined as ‘the close
supervision of the dependent’ (1997: 1). Mead’s concern in this volume is
a political one: to develop new ‘supervisory policies’ that can be ‘directed
toward the poor or disadvantaged, or at least members of these groups
who become dependent on society’ (1997: 2). The aim of such policies is
to move from a conception of welfare as an automatic right for the poor
to something that is to be dependent on them meeting ‘certain behav-
ioural requirements’ (Mead, 1997: 2; emphasis added). Underlying this
shift is a distinction between the poor that are deserving, or who are well-
behaved and exhibit the correct behavioural traits, and the deviant poor
who are not. Mead’s blueprint for a ‘new paternalism’ centres explicitly
on changing the behaviour and habits of the poor, and in the first eight
pages of The New Paternalism, there are four references to ‘behavioural
requirements’ and one reference to ‘good behaviour’. For Mead, behav-
ioural change is to be achieved through government-led initiatives that
actively seek to change and control the lifestyles of the poor, first, by
enforcing norms that should be obligatory (for example, ‘policies that
make school attendance compulsory for children or require welfare
recipients to work as a condition of receiving aid’ (1997: 4); and,
second, by granting government agencies the power ‘to judge individual
interests’ and, with this, the ‘right to tell its dependents how to live, at
least in some respects’ (1997: 4). This is the basis of a new paternalist
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social policy that is ‘directive’ in basis, and which emphasizes the obli-
gations of welfare ‘clients’ instead of prioritizing their rights or needs (see
Mead, 1997: 21).
Mead’s primary contribution to a social policy that is directive in this
way is workfare (see Mead et al., 1997): a government-led initiative that
seeks to address ‘low work levels among poor adults’ by enforcing work
as a requirement for welfare benefits provided by the state in return.
Mead argues that this form of directive social policy is required because
the poor cannot be left to seek work on a voluntary basis as their situ-
ation results from their ‘passivity’, or, put bluntly, from the fact that
‘they do so little to help themselves’ (1992: 213). Active governance
from state agencies is thus needed, for Mead, to discipline the poor in
order to make sure that welfare support is well-deserved. This means that
poverty is treated as something rooted in the behaviour and values of
those who are dependent on welfare for their survival, not as a systemic
property of a capitalist system that operates to the advantage of a few
against the many. There are similarities here with the work of Giddens, in
which the poor are encouraged to change their lifestyles by becoming
more entrepreneurial and engaging in ‘active risk taking’ to better them-
selves (see Giddens, 1998: 116). But in the work of Mead, more directly,
the poor are seen to be at blame for being poor, and because of this their
position can be improved through state intervention and governance that
changes their behaviour and conduct.
This argument has a strong racial dimension. For just as the poor are
said to be at blame for their position because of their lack of desire to
work, Mead argues that ‘black success’ is prevented, for the most part,
not by structural forms of racism and discrimination, but by misplaced
beliefs and inadequate family structures (see Mead et al., 1997: 14–15).
Mead’s answer is to emphasize and enforce the value of work, which is
said to be the cure for ‘family failures’ and the moral ineptitude of the
poor. He writes: ‘Those who would be free must first be bound. . . The
source of bondage for today’s seriously poor is no longer social injustice
but the disorders of their private lives. For these Americans, the way
forward is no longer liberation but obligation’ (p. 15). And this, in
sum, is the basis of his new paternalism: a corrective form of governance
that identifies the causes of inequality as lying within the private lives and
associated family structures of individuals, and which sees paid work,
rather than welfare, as the solution.
It would appear, at first sight, that the new paternalism of Mead and
the libertarian paternalism of Thaler and Sunstein are far removed from
one another. Mead, in a review of Nudge, takes issue with many of the
core principles of Thaler and Sunstein’s work. He argues that while, in
Nudge, humans are presented as irrational beings, there is one group, in
particular, that possesses ‘serious dysfunctions’: the underclass. Because
of this, he says, social policy should be strongly paternalistic, and that for
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the benefit of society more widely the behaviour of this group must be
governed: ‘Welfare recipients must work to get aid, the homeless must
obey rules to get shelter, and students must pass tests to be promoted in
school. Those demands are not libertarian. They are presented as obli-
gations, not choices’ (Mead, 2009). Mead, furthermore, objects to the
underlying economism of Thaler and Sunstein’s position, arguing that
while they are critical of homo economicus, nonetheless they remain
wedded to a model of economic (ir)rationality, and this, among other
things, ignores the moral basis of capitalism. This underlying morality,
which is not purely economic in basis, is, he argues, rooted in the ‘ten-
dency to care about the views of others’, and is not a violation of ration-
ality but a virtue that is a distinguishing feature of the modern Western
order, one that is missing elsewhere. Mead writes: ‘A lack of trust and
civility is one reason markets fail to make societies rich in the less devel-
oped world’ (2009).
Such proclamations are far removed from the soft economic paternal-
ism advocated by Thaler and Sunstein, and there are at least three other
differences between nudge economics andMead’s new paternalism that are
worthy of note; differences that in some respects also reveal points of
convergence. First, whereas Mead’s work centres on correcting the poor
by requiring them to work for benefits, Thaler and Sunstein frame Nudge
as being of universal benefit to humankind, not just the poor, by encoura-
ging individuals to become better, self-benefitting consumers. Rather than
targeting a group explicitly, such as the ‘black’ and ‘poor’ in the work of
Mead, which is then directed to improve itself through work, the nudge
agenda seeks to empower individuals in general to better their lives by
nudging them closer to a fictional model of homo economicus. The ques-
tion, however, is whether nudges are indeed to be applied in general or
rather to improve the lives of individuals who deviate furthest from an
economically ‘rational’ behavioural norm. If the rich, while still prone to
making mistakes, come closest to this norm given that at some point they
have made good financial decisions, then does this mean that it is the poor,
in particular, that need nudging to be better decision-makers? And does
this imply, by extension, and in line with the work of Mead, that poverty
can be explained by the behavioural traits of different individuals and
groups? It might be noted that this is not the only point on which the
positions of Mead and Thaler and Sunstein potentially converge, for both
call for responsibilities to be passed downwards from the state to individ-
uals who are then expected to take better care of themselves. In the work
of Mead the poor should take responsibility for their own fate while being
directed and supervised by state agencies, while in Thaler and Sunstein
individual consumers are to be nudged to make choices from which they
will benefit. What is missing, however, in both cases, is any concern for
structural forms of power and privilege that produce and maintain forms
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of material inequality and which shape and constrain the very basis of
choice-making; a point to which we will return below.
Second, whereas Mead’s directive social policy is to be government-
led, the work of Thaler and Sunstein gives increased prominence to
‘experts’ or ‘choice architects’ who not only declare themselves to be
politically neutral (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 14–15), but also
claim to reduce the cost and increase the effectiveness of government
through the application of scientific methods and principles drawn
from the field of behavioural science. Will Davies rightly views the emer-
gence of such experts as a key feature of neoliberalism: ‘We see
new breeds of expert – coach, regulator, risk manager, strategist, guru
– offering toolkits and advice on how to navigate and act upon a con-
stantly changing and unpredictable environment’ (2014: 29). He adds
that these ‘technocrats do not fit tidily into categories of ‘‘science’’ or
‘‘politics’’, as they are neither ‘‘objectively’’ disengaged like the scientist,
nor goal oriented like the politician’ (2014: 29). Does this description
apply to choice architects such as Thaler and Sunstein? They claim
that the nudge agenda is independent of any particular political ideology
because it is underpinned by hard science, and, because of this, can be
used to cross ‘partisan divides’ (2008: 15). At the conclusion of his book
Misbehaving, Thaler declares that behavioural scientists ‘have a lot of
wisdom’, and that we should draw on this ‘by carefully selecting nudges
based on science and subjecting these to rigorous tests’ (2015: 345; on the
use of randomized control trials, which Sunstein (2014: 11) terms ‘the
gold standard for empirical research’, see Thaler, 2015: 338–43). Whether
nudge economics is indeed a form of value-free science will be considered
below, but, for the moment, it is important to note that the goal of the
nudge is not to introduce new government-led initiatives, such as Mead’s
workfare, but to transform the understandings and techniques of gov-
ernment itself through the application of principles drawn from behav-
ioural science, or what Davies (2014: 167) aptly terms ‘economic
psychology’. Throughout Nudge, the gains from such behaviourally-
informed government are presented primarily in economic terms: they
can help cut through red-tape and avoid waste (on the so-called ‘Red
Tape Challenge’ see Halpern, 2015: 57); they can make changes to the
underlying architecture of consumer choice at very little cost; and
because of this there is ‘no burden on taxpayers at all’ (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008: 14). The aim, then, is to transform the culture and prac-
tice of government rather than extend the scope and reach of state power,
as with the harder paternalism advocated by Mead. Hence, Thaler and
Sunstein declare, in a key opening passage of Nudge, that ‘we are not for
bigger government, just for better governance’ (2008: 15, emphasis in
original).
Third, whereas, for Mead, the family is the key social institution for
promoting personal and public welfare, the value and role of this
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institution within nudge theory is less clear. One complication is that
Thaler and Sunstein draw a vision of libertarianism from the work of
Milton Friedman, and in particular from his co-authored book with his
wife Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (1980). While it might be presumed
that a strong libertarian position such as that advanced by Friedman
might not see the value of social institutions such as the family, quite
the opposite is the case. For in Free to Choose, Milton and Rose
Friedman state that: ‘The family, rather than the individual, has
always been and remains today the basic building block of our society,
though its hold has clearly been weakening – one of the most unfortunate
consequences of the growth of government paternalism’ (1980: 33). While
it might come as a surprise that, for Friedman, the family rather than the
market is the key societal institution, as Melinda Cooper (2017: 42–9) has
shown in detail, this position is closely tied to his broader stance on the
question of welfare reform. How, then, do Thaler and Sunstein position
themselves in relation to these arguments by Friedman and Mead on the
status of the family? Their answer is to radicalize Friedman’s libertarian-
ism by arguing that if government paternalism has a tendency to weaken
the family unit, then the solution is to privatize marriage so that ‘the
directive and exclusionary role of the state’ is reduced (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008: 221). Their position is thus quite different to neo-con-
servative approaches, including the new paternalism of Mead, that seek
to reinstate traditional family values. Their answer instead is to argue
that the current institution of marriage ‘is not nearly libertarian enough’
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 218) as it ‘creates a monopoly on the legal
form of marriage; imposes sharp limits on who may enter and how; and
accompanies the legal form with material and symbolic benefits that it
alone confers’ (2008: 219). Thaler and Sunstein are insistent that the state
should not interfere in such private matters, but with one notable excep-
tion: where the interests of children are involved. In such cases, legal
‘mandates’ rather than mere behavioural nudges are said to be ‘perfectly
appropriate’ (2008: 218).
Such questions regarding the limits of state paternalism, including who
it should apply to and the form it should take, return us to the concerns
of 19th-century political economy and in particular the work of John
Stuart Mill, which, at its core, addresses what Claeys terms ‘the nature
and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society
over the individual’ (Mill, 1991: 5). Mill’s ideas feature prominently in
the work of libertarian paternalists such as Sunstein, and in particular his
book Why Nudge?, which takes the following passage from Mill’s On
Liberty as one of its epigraphs:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
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sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or for-
bear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make
him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be
wise, or even right. (Sunstein, 2014; see Mill, 1991: 14)
This passage is quoted routinely within libertarian readings of Mill (of
which there are many; see Claeys, 2013: 1) that call for freedom of the
individual from the powers of the state except in instances where harm is
caused to others (the so-called ‘harm principle’). In such readings, Mill is
celebrated as a champion of negative liberty and of the private freedoms
of the individual, as exemplified by his declaration that ‘Over himself,
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’ (Mill, 1991: 14).
But caution must be exercised here as, isolated passages aside, Mill is by
no means a libertarian in the sense advocated by Thaler and Sunstein.
Elsewhere in On Liberty, Mill, while asserting the value of individuality,
not only declares that ‘no person is an entirely isolated being’ (1991: 88),
with the implication that private choices and harms are likely to impact
on the lives of others, but also that the state should be positioned to
maintain ‘a vigilant control’ of the power an individual can exercise over
others (see 1991: 116). Moreover, as Claeys (2013: 11) rightly argues, it is
a mistake to read Mill’s On Liberty in isolation from his other major
works, in particular Principles of Political Economy. A broader reading
of Mill reveals that in important respects he favoured state intervention
to promote social equality and justice – a commitment that is far
removed from the work of Friedman, which, in turn, is the touchstone
of libertarianism for Thaler and Sunstein. Claeys (2013: 119) observes
that, for Mill, such intervention is to take many different forms: the state
should tackle inequality through redistributive taxation and land reform;
it should exclude uneducated people from franchise; and it should coun-
ter the excesses of free market capitalism through the introduction of
Poor Laws. And on this basis, Claeys describes Mill’s approach as pater-
nalist rather than libertarian, for ‘it sought to augment happiness, secur-
ity, liberty and equality where these failed to result from individual
activity freely themselves’ (2013: 122). Nothing, seemingly, could be fur-
ther from the libertarian cause.
Sunstein does not side either with Mill’s state paternalism (as
described by Claeys above, and which is barely recognized in
Sunstein’s account) or with his harm principle. Rather, Why Nudge?
(2014) opens with the declaration that ‘it is exceedingly important to
limit the power of government, and of course individuals often know
best. Adults should not be treated like children’. It continues: ‘On
those scores, Mill still has a great deal to teach us’ (2014: 5). Sunstein,
however, objects to Mill’s harm principle (which is not seen to be pater-
nalistic; see Sunstein, 2014: 80) on the grounds that humans are prone to
behavioural biases of different types and thus make mistakes that can
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result in serious harm to themselves and to others (see Sunstein, 2014:
163). For this reason, he argues, a soft form of paternalism is necessary
to tackle the ‘internalities’, or the irrationalities of individual choice-
making that lead to ‘problems of self-control and errors in judgement’
(Sunstein, 2014: 37), rather than the externalities, or unforeseen risks and
uncertainties, that have been a key concern of economics from the work
of Arthur Pigou onwards.
Sunstein refines this argument by making two important qualifications
about the type of paternalism he has in mind. First, he draws a distinc-
tion between ‘means’ paternalists, who seek to improve the choices
people make to reach their desired ends, and ‘ends’ paternalists, who
attempt to narrow freedom of choice with the intention of benefitting
the well-being of the chooser. Sunstein firmly advocates the former
(means paternalism) and argues that the aim of libertarian paternalism
is ‘to create choice architecture that will make it more likely that people
will promote their own ends, as they themselves understand them’ (2014: 19,
emphasis in original). And second, he argues that the nudge agenda is in
keeping with ‘soft’ paternalism in so far as it seeks to ‘improve people’s
welfare by influencing their choices without imposing material costs on
these choices’ (2014: 58, emphasis in original). On both counts,
Sunstein argues, this form of paternalism can still be termed libertarian
because it seeks neither to direct people towards particular ends nor
restrict the range of ends from which they are able to choose.
Sunstein returns to these questions in his book On Freedom (2019a), in
which he identifies what he calls ‘navigability’ as the main challenge for
people to be free in the modern world. For while individuals should be
free to do what they wish without harming or coercing others, the ques-
tions that follow as a consequence are: what if they ‘do not know how to
find their way? What if they have no idea?’ (2019a: 1). The answer is that
choice architects should help people select the right means to reach their
desired ends or destination, not by providing rules or guidance but rather
‘a kind of map’ (2019a: 40) that suggests possible routes to different
destinations without prescribing any in particular. Again, it is instructive
to contrast this position to that of Mead, as the question of navigation is
a repeated theme in his work on what he calls the ‘passivity’ of the poor.
Mead explains that in using the term ‘passive’, ‘I do not mean they lack
all energy – their activity may be frenetic – but their actions lack purpose
and direction’ (Mead, 1992: 213). And because of this, he argues, super-
vised programs of workfare, rather than a ‘map’, are necessary: ‘These
measures assume that the people concerned need assistance but that they
also need direction if they are to live constructively’ (Mead, 1994: 2).
Whereas, for Mead, workfare is the means not only to welfare but to
citizenship and inclusion within society more generally, Sunstein seeks to
apply theories and methods of behavioural science in order to identify
specific ‘human’ behavioural traits or internalities that can be addressed
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through new forms of psychological governance – traits that include
‘limited attention’, ‘self-control problems’, and ‘behavioural biases’
such as short-term attention to the present (see Mead, 2019: 15). As a
consequence, Sunstein does not move directly from a behavioural ana-
lysis of specific groups to a set of disciplinary policy interventions, as in
Mead’s new paternalism, but instead insists that nudges can be deployed
to help groups of individuals, most notably the poor, to help themselves.
He declares, for example, that ‘insufficient navigability’ is a ‘pervasive
problem’ for poor people, and that nudge architects should make modest
interventions to structure choice to enable them to find the ‘right track’.
The answer, he argues, is not to impose rules or burdens, but to make it
easier for individuals to navigate themselves through different life-
choices. The idea of a map is again used to illustrate this point: ‘A
GPS device respects people’s ends; it does not quarrel with their judge-
ment about their preferred destination’ (Sunstein, 2019a: 47). The land-
scape of capitalist society is thus not identified as the problem (if
anything it is naturalized by representing it in the form of a map), but
rather how individuals can navigate this world successfully, to the benefit
of themselves. This means that there is little, if any, attention, to the
social and political topologies of this map that make travel to certain
destinations possible for some but not for others.
The Choice Architect as Father Figure?
While Thaler and Sunstein’s nudge philosophy is built upon the above
commitment to libertarian paternalism, most critical engagement with
their work has centred on the former of these two terms and has left
their idea of paternalism largely untouched. This is surprising not least
because paternalism, as a form of authority, is gendered, as it appeals by
definition to the wisdom and power of the father (pater-). Jessica Pykett
is one of the few critics to address this aspect of nudge theory, as she
argues that Nudge is gendered to its core as, first, its theoretical frame-
work is based on ‘insights from sometimes highly gendered accounts of
human behaviour’ (2012: 219–20); and, second, its commitment to liber-
tarian paternalism reproduces a view of the welfare or ‘nanny’ state as a
feminine form from which women are ‘illegitimate beneficiaries’, and in
its place asserts a ‘masculine norm of independence and self-reliance’
(2012: 231). Pykett rightly calls into question the gendered politics of
Thaler and Sunstein’s libertarianism but, in so doing, says little about
their accompanying commitment to paternalism, even though this form
of authority is said to provide a corrective to the flaws of previous forms
of libertarian thinking and politics. In order to consider the values that
underpin nudge theory, it is thus necessary to look more closely at the
concept and politics of paternalism and ask why this idea occupies such a
central place in Thaler and Sunstein’s work.
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This, however, is more difficult than it might seem as there are sur-
prisingly few existing analyses of paternalism. One exception is a book-
length study by John Kleinig, which defines paternalism as a form of
‘enforced benevolence’ that is based on a model of ‘familial relationships’
within which ‘parents act on the presumption that they know better than
the child what is best for the latter’ (1983: 4). Kleinig argues that these
relationships are based on a model of the authority of the ‘parent (or
father)’, and adds that there is an ‘implicit sexism’ to this term, particu-
larly when it is used ‘to characterize circumstances in which women are
singled out as the special object of enforced benevolence. . . (in virtue of
their status as ‘‘the weaker sex’’)’ (1983: 4). Kleinig’s bracketing out of
the ‘father’ is disappointing as it avoids the question of whether pater-
nal forms of authority are gendered by definition, a move confirmed by
his declaration that he is interested in enforced benevolence in general
rather than ‘its sexist manifestations’ and thus in ‘parentalism rather than
paternalism in a restricted sense’ (1983: 4). This sidesteps the issue: that
paternalism is a concept that invokes a patriarchal ideal of the family
within which the father carries authority and thus is said to know best –
both within and beyond the household. Viewed in this way, paternalism
cannot be read in a ‘restricted sense’ as it is not a model of parenthood in
general or in the abstract, but rather a direct appeal to the power of the
father, not only within the family unit but, potentially, within any other
social institution.
Through the course of Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein assert the norma-
tive value of this form of authority by making it central to what they see
as good governance and improved choice-making. Given this, Pykett
finds it ‘extraordinary’ that ‘so little time is given to considering the
question of gender’, especially as the ideas of John Stuart Mill feature
so prominently in their work. Mill argued, among other things, ‘that
liberty should be extended to women hitherto excluded from self-deter-
mination and well-being’ (Pykett, 2012: 232), and his gender politics
proved to be divisive within the history of 20th-century libertarian and
neoliberal thought. Ludwig von Mises, for example, argued that Mill’s
‘feeble compromises’ were made ‘under the influence of his wife’ (1985:
195), and implies that this was the root cause for the decline of his liberal
project – a position that was not shared, in turn, by Hayek (1951).
However, even if one celebrates Mill’s progressive views on gender equal-
ity, serious problems remain with his concept of paternalism, which
advocates the exercise of power over populations that are said to be
unable to govern themselves, usually on the grounds that they lack cul-
tural, economic or political development. Against the use of such a con-
cept, the answer is not to follow Kleinig, and arguably Thaler and
Sunstein, in using paternalism in a ‘less restricted way’, but rather to
take issue with the type of authority that is invoked by the use of this
term – a form of authority that is not only implicitly gendered but which
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has been used, more generally, to legitimate the exercise of absolute
power over subjects deemed too unenlightened to be capable of self-
determination.
Mill’s position in Principles of Political Economy is that liberty should
‘apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties’, and that in
cases where societies are ‘backward’ there is a case for ‘despotism as a
legitimate mode of government’ (see Mill, 1991: 14–15; for a more
detailed assessment of such passages in Mill’s work see Claeys, 2013:
93–9). Sunstein is aware of this argument by Mill, which he says raises
‘obvious questions about parochialism and condescension’ (2014: 34).
But he is seemingly oblivious that such arguments have been deployed
historically in order to justify patriarchal and colonial forms of govern-
ance that have sought to exclude populations from democratic freedoms.
Quinn Slobodian addresses this issue in detail in his book Globalists, and
quotes Fritz Machlup, a member of the Mont Pelerin Society and
President of the International Economic Association from 1971–4:
Let me recall Mill’s dictum that there can be no liberty for ‘savages’.
Replace this harsh word by ‘politically and intellectually immature
people’ and reflect on the proposition that full democracy may not
be the most suitable system of government for such people; that, for
example, the unlimited right to vote and elect the men who will
govern the country may lead to the destruction of many other free-
doms and also of any real chance for economic development.
(Machlup cited in Slobodian, 2018: 146)
Slobodian reveals that Machlup was not alone in holding such views.
Wilhelm Röpke, a key figure in the ordoliberal movement and fellow
Mont Pelerin Society member, deployed similar arguments in his defence
of apartheid in South Africa. The idea of paternalism fromMill onwards,
then, has had an unpleasant political history, but, nonetheless, Thaler
and Sunstein see value in preserving this concept, albeit it in revised form.
It is far from clear, however, how their argument for freedom of choice
provides a corrective to a model of authority based on the real or sym-
bolic power of the father, and which has been closely tied, in some
instances, to the legitimation of patriarchal and colonial power. The
question begs: if Thaler and Sunstein have no sympathy towards such
a model of authority, then why place paternalism, a concept that they say
is ‘reviled’ and ‘which is weighted down by stereotypes from popular
culture and politics’ (2008: 5), at the heart of the nudge agenda? Why
not simply advance a range of behavioural insights and associated policy
interventions without tying these to an accompanying political commit-
ment to libertarian paternalism?
The answers to these questions are not immediately apparent, for
rather than present themselves as social conservatives who wish to
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reinforce the value of existing forms of male authority, Thaler and
Sunstein see themselves as being progressive on questions of race and
gender. To take the example of marriage, they argue that this institution
has a ‘highly discriminatory past’ that is enmeshed in ‘sexual and racial
inequality’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 215), largely because it has been
controlled by the state through ‘an official licensing scheme’. In place of
such arrangement, they argue, marriage should be abolished and civil
unions introduced in its place (see 2008: 224) along with nudges ‘to pro-
tect those who are most vulnerable’ (2008: 221). Thaler and Sunstein’s
primary target here is the state, which in exercising a monopoly over
private affairs, has, they say, created and reproduced forms of sexual
and racial inequality that would otherwise not exist. Again, the state is
positioned as the cause rather than the answer to such problems. Thaler
and Sunstein’s solution is for individuals to be free to enter private part-
nerships without state interference, and where necessary be nudged by
behavioural experts to make such partnerships work effectively. In keep-
ing with neoliberalism more generally, there is nothing, it seems, that
privatization cannot fix.
But why does the libertarian devolvement of state power to individual
choices and contracts need to be accompanied by a form of authority –
paternalism – that invokes the power of a father figure in the form of a
choice architect? There are two possible explanations, neither of which
are satisfactory. First, that Thaler and Sunstein believe, like Kleinig, that
the term paternalism can be used in a general way to describe a soft form
of power that works through the benevolence of experts rather than in
service of any particular group, gendered or otherwise. Second, that there
is no such naivety to Thaler and Sunstein’s position, as it is guided by an
underlying social conservatism, one that is in keeping with Friedman’s
idealization of the family as an alternative to the state that can provide
welfare through other means.
It is not clear which of these explanations is correct. It might be argued
in response that to talk about paternalism, on one hand, and to assign a
privileged role to a particular member of a household, on the other, are
two different things, for while the prefix ‘pater-’ has gender connotations
it does not mean that paternalism as a form of authority is used and
invoked by Thaler and Sunstein in ways that are gendered. But if this is
the case, then how can a concept that defines a form of male authority,
and which makes a direct appeal to the power and wisdom of the father,
be used in a normative but gender-neutral way? Indeed, why is it any
more acceptable to speak in favour of libertarian paternalism rather than
for libertarian patriachalism as a new form of governance. Thaler and
Sunstein do more than use paternalism as a purely conceptual or analyt-
ical term – they advocate it, politically, as a normative alternative to
state-centred power and what they call ‘aggressive government planning’
(2008: 15). Moreover, in appealing to libertarian paternalism they
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neutralize the structural politics of gender and race by dealing with them
as problems created by the ‘directive and exclusionary role of the state’
(2008: 221) – problems that can then be remedied by individual or loca-
lized behavioural interventions or nudges.
The limits and consequences of such an approach have been revealed
starkly by the Covid-19 crisis, which, in the UK, has had a dispropor-
tionate impact on BME communities, the old, and those doing caring
work. In the face of this crisis, the UK Behavioural Insights Team has
acknowledged that ‘structural racism affects the broader life chances of
ethnic minority groups in the UK, and the discrimination they experience
in other areas can in turn undermine mental and physical health experi-
ences and behaviours’ (see https://www.bi.team/blogs/the-disproportion-
ate-impact-of-covid-19-on-ethnic-minorities-in-the-uk-and-what-we-can-
do-about-it/). But rather than tackle the root causes of such ‘structural
racism’, their answer is to produce behavioural solutions for dealing with
its effects. The problem with such an approach is that it bypasses any
concern for institutional and structural forms of power and inequality by
focusing instead on the behavioural deficiencies of particular actors. To
give an example: Sunstein, as stated above, declares that ‘insufficient
navigability’ is a ‘pervasive problem for the poor’ (2019a: 46). But is
poverty really a problem of ‘navigability’, a problem of individuals
being unable to find their own way and failing to make the right choices?
Or, rather, is poverty a systemic property of capitalist society, and the
product of racial, gendered, and classed forms of politics and power, the
drivers and dynamics of which nudge economics leaves largely
untouched?
Nudging for Good?
This raises the question of what Thaler means when he asks choice archi-
tects to ‘nudge for good’ (see Halpern, 2015: xiv). Such questions con-
cerning the ‘good’ take us beyond the limits of science and into a world of
political values and judgements that both underpin and follow from
Thaler and Sunstein’s commitment to libertarianism paternalism. One
of the main presuppositions of Nudge is that freedom of consumer
choice is necessarily a good thing, and, because of this, the state
should not intervene in the operation of free market processes unless
absolutely necessary, although where this threshold lies is not altogether
clear. In their view, it is freedom of individual choice rather than the
exercise of state power that is the most effective mechanism for limiting
the ability of nudge experts and perhaps even big business to coerce or
manipulate individual consumers to follow particular ends. Thaler and
Sunstein declare that ‘Freedom to choose is the best safeguard against
bad choice architecture’ (2008: 12), for if individuals do not like a nudge
or a choice, then they are free to opt for something else. But is this likely
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given that Thaler and Sunstein’s rationale for nudging is that humans
lack willpower and are afflicted with problems of ‘self-control’? And if
nudges are subtle, and involve changing default options, will individuals
even be aware that they have been nudged in the first place?
These problems perhaps explain why Thaler and Sunstein’s commitment
to individual freedom of choice as a ‘safeguard’ against coercion is
accompanied by a plea for choice architects to nudge for good, as their
work, by design, structures the very basis of this freedom. But even if the
call to nudge for good is well-intentioned, how can choice architects
know for sure what is good for those they are nudging (see Brown,
2012)? Halpern (2015: 187–97), for example, writes at length about the
benefits of using e-cigarettes, but the long-term risks of using them are far
from clear. Elsewhere, Sunstein (2019b: xii) argues that there is good
reason for a state ban or mandate to be imposed on trans fats, but
what about other instances in which consumer choices are riddled with
known unknowns? Who knows, for example, what the long-term effects
are of consuming genetically modified foods, chlorinated chicken, or
crops treated with new pesticides? And in the face of the latest crisis,
can behavioural interventions designed to promote ‘herd immunity’ be
sure that they will provide a long-term solution to Covid-19, one that will
justify the deaths of those who are old, weak, and/or poor that will
necessarily come as a consequence?
The answer appears to be that we should place trust in the expertise
and judgement of the choice architect, as well as their capacity to nudge
for good. In Nudge, it is the humanness of individual actors rather than
consumer society more generally that is identified as the problem, and the
solution that follows is to make these actors into subjects that can make
better choices from which they will benefit – this is the essence of what
Thaler and Sunstein call ‘nudging for good’. But there are at least two
problems here. First, how can we know that choice architects will not be
afflicted by the same behavioural biases as the subjects they seek to
nudge, or does their expert knowledge of behavioural science mean
that they are largely immune to the irrationalities of their own human-
ness? And second, while Thaler and Sunstein are vocal in their criticism
of the coercive power of the state, they say comparatively little about the
potential for commercial organizations to use nudges for their own ends.
This is remarkable given that techniques of nudging have long been used
by commercial agencies to influence consumer behaviour with the aim of
maximizing profits: from the successes of marketing and branding
through to product placement and the design of shop-floors to increase
consumer spending (see Jones et al., 2013: viii). This ability to nudge
consumers is considered in detail by Shoshana Zuboff in her landmark
book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019), which brings this issue
into the digital age by considering the online ‘nudging’, ‘herding’ and
‘conditioning’ of consumers in order to boost commercial interests by
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marrying ‘behaviour modification and the technological means to auto-
mate its application’ (Zuboff, 2019). The key point is that while digital
architectures and platforms might appear to be value-neutral, or be mar-
keted as working for the individual and social good, close attention needs
to be paid to values embedded with them, and the ends to which they
operate.
Skeggs and Yuill make exactly this point about social media technol-
ogies such as Facebook, which work through algorithms that are funda-
mentally ideological because they create ‘value through capture and
connectivity, maximizing their own potential through operations on
themselves, as they model users and relationships’ (2016a: 1368). The
ability for social media technologies such as Facebook to nudge users
towards making particular economic and political choices has been well-
documented following the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which received
mass public attention following the 2019 film The Great Hack. But
Skeggs and Yuill argue, further, that such platforms are ideological in
less obvious ways because they ‘lubricate the circuits of capitalism’ by
influencing social networks over time, and, with this, how users interact
both on and offline: ‘with whom, when, how’ (2016b: 391). In these
terms, Facebook is the nudge architecture par excellence because it can
influence behaviour not by adopting state-led mechanisms of coercion
but by structuring choice itself: its power is effectively in its platform. As
Tamsin Shaw (2017) explains, this is no accident as at the outset of the
social media revolution figures such as Kahneman and Thaler gave mas-
terclasses to key figures in Silicon Valley – masterclasses that led many
companies to adopt behavioural-economic principles that aided the
design of ‘automated machine-learned ‘‘nudges’’’ that could give them
‘significant business advantage’ (Shaw, 2017). Nudges, then, are not
simply neutral devices that enable individual consumers to make better
choices for themselves but are psychological techniques that have a his-
tory of being used to structure choice according to strong commercial
and political imperatives.
Nudge as Neoliberalism
Thaler and Sunstein’s positioning of libertarian paternalism at the heart
of Nudge indicates that this is not simply a work of economics but is also,
and perhaps foremost, a political project. At the outset of this book, they
claim not to align nudge philosophy with any party-political commit-
ment, even though they state that they have little sympathy with
Democrats who have ‘enthusiasm for aggressive government planning’
(2008: 15). Instead, they declare that the nudge agenda is ‘neither left or
right’, and because of this offers the potential of a new, ‘real’ third way:
‘one that can break through some of the least tractable debates in con-
temporary democracies’ by working between what they call ‘rigid
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mandates’, on the one hand, and ‘dogmatic laissez faire’, on the other
(2008: 254). Nudge offers an alternative because it advocates a politics of
a different sort, one that plays out through the ideas and actions of
experts and advisory teams that are able to influence decision-making
both within and beyond the formal arena of party politics. Sunstein
declares, quite openly, that ‘Those who favour nudges do not trust gov-
ernment’ (2019a: 22), and hence a primary objective of the nudge agenda
is to change the basis of politics and the grounds upon which it proceeds.
Nowhere is this clearer than in George Osborne and Richard Thaler’s
(2010) commitment to ‘embed behavioural thinking throughout govern-
ment’ that was put into practice through the early years of the
Conservative-led coalition. The Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) was
established in the UK at almost exactly the same time that this govern-
ment, under the guidance of George Osborne, unveiled an aggressive
austerity programme that was designed to roll back the extent and
reach of the welfare state. Notably, in David Halpern’s 2015 book
Inside the Nudge Unit, there is not a single reference to this programme
in spite of the fact that the unit he headed (and which had been advised
by Thaler) was at that time located in the Cabinet Office. Instead,
Halpern sings the praises of the BIT and the ‘millions of healthy life
years’ it helped save, arguing that behavioural solutions are required to
tackle ‘entrenched poverty’ because the ‘world and challenges we face
have changed’ (Halpern, 2015: 342–50).
It is important to remember, however, how the world, and in particu-
lar the UK, changed under the austerity policies of this period. It is worth
citing the work of Bev Skeggs at length, who, writing in the same year as
Halpern, provides a stark account of their impact:
in the UK in the last few years there have been £18 billion cuts to
the welfare budget, leading to the establishment of 423 food banks
in Britain which feed 913,138 people including 330,205 children.
How can the existence of class be denied when the real incomes
for the poorest have fallen 40 per cent, and 33 per cent of families
lack basic resources, and where the longest depression of wages
since 1979 has occurred and the cost of living has risen by 25 per
cent in the last 5 years, and where the top 10 per cent of households
in the UK are now 850 times wealthier than the bottom 10 per cent?
This is in the seventh richest country in the world where the rich are
getting richer, and where the top rate of income tax has been halved
(it was 83 per cent in 1979) for the richest. Britain’s richest increased
their wealth by £69 billion in 2014 alone. (Skeggs, 2015: 206–7)
Halpern himself presents nudge economics as something that is in keep-
ing with austere times, as he writes that ‘behavioural insights have proven
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to be an effective tool to help refine and improve the cost-effectiveness of
policies’ (2015: 333), while at the same time insisting that such insights
can improve public services and empower those that use them. Such
insights, however, were introduced in the UK against a backdrop of a
sustained attack on public services and on the welfare state more gener-
ally, with the consequence that responsibilities were passed downwards
to individuals with the expectation that they look after themselves, only
with fewer material resources to do so. Is such an attack on the welfare
state in keeping with the libertarian commitments of Thaler and
Sunstein’s soft paternalism? Yes, for the very essence of libertarian pol-
itics, regardless of how soft they might be, is that the individual and the
private are the sources of all things good. Hence, state support is neither
desirable nor necessary, and in its place choice architects should guide
people to care better for themselves. In this sense, austerity politics and
libertarian paternalism are well-matched to each other, with the latter
seeking to provide individualized solutions to the social problems gener-
ated by the former.
What type of politics, then, is at stake in libertarian paternalism? An
initial clue can be found in the figures that Thaler and Sunstein draw
upon to formulate their brand of paternalism, which include Friedrich
Hayek (the ‘greatest critic of socialism’; Sunstein, 2019a: 21) and Milton
Friedman (or, as Thaler (2015: 51) calls him, ‘Uncle Miltie’). Nudge
theory might appear, at first sight, to work outside of existing neoliberal
frameworks as it mixes an argument for individual consumer freedoms
with a new form of paternalism based on psychological interventions of
different types. But, on closer inspection, libertarian paternalism is neo-
liberal to its core, as among other things, it: aims to limit the powers
of the state to impose mandates and bans that restrict the extent and
reach of corporate power; positions the individual consumer as sover-
eign, thereby dispensing with any explicit concern for collective social
properties of any type; treats the underlying structure of life-choice as
psychological rather than social in basis and thus as something that can
be remedied through small behavioural interventions; conceptualizes
freedom in economic terms as consumer freedom or freedom of con-
sumer choice; empowers a new breed of behavioural experts to work
outside of party politics but, nonetheless, retain political influence on
the grounds that their insights are grounded in science and therefore
politically neutral; passes responsibilities downwards from the state to
individuals by helping them to make ‘better’ choices for themselves;
advocates new forms of governance that are informed by principles
drawn from consumer psychology, and which are to apply to government
itself; and operates, in the UK at least, as the partner to an austerity
programme designed to roll back the extent and reach of the welfare
state. But whereas neoliberalism, as conventionally understood, is a
state project (see, for example, Foucault, 2008: 84), the nudge agenda
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shifts attention from the state to the governance of individuals. In so
doing, Nudge departs from more traditional forms of libertarianism on
the grounds that free markets do not govern themselves. This is not
because the state is needed to protect market freedoms and inject a
spirit of competition into all aspects of social life, as suggested by
Foucault in his lectures on ordoliberalism, but because individual
market actors, with all their irrationalities, cannot be governed, or as
Sunstein terms it, disciplined by market dynamics and processes. For
this, another form of neoliberal governance is needed – the nudge –
which, as McMahon succinctly puts it, seeks to ‘fix individuals for the
market’ (2015: 149).
It is little surprise, then, that the nudge agenda has flourished in the
wake of the financial crisis –a crisis which, for neoliberals, resulted not
from the failures of markets per se but from the irrationalities of market
participants and/or government interventions (George Osborne and
Richard Thaler (2010), in particular, pinpoint the failures of Blair-
Brown’s Labour government, under which the financial crisis in the
UK initially played out). At a deeper level, John McMahon argues
that nudge economics combines aspects of the two main trajectories of
neoliberal reason documented by Foucault in his biopolitics lectures:
German ordoliberalism and Chicago School neoliberalism. In terms of
the former, McMahon argues that Nudge seeks to ‘render the entire
social field intelligible through economic analysis’ (2015: 149), while at
the same time, in terms of the latter, enhancing human capital by produ-
cing a more rational homo economicus – one closer to what Foucault
(2008) calls an ‘entrepreneurial self’. In practice, however, Thaler and
Sunstein’s position is more complex than this, for, like Hayek, they reject
the figure of homo economicus as an empirical reality, but, unlike him,
retain it in the background as an ideal towards which individual subjec-
tivities can be corrected by the interventions of behavioural experts. This
emphasis on the role of such experts is at odds with Hayek’s view that
human rationality and knowledge is limited by its very nature, and hence
that we should look to markets rather than to government officials or
agencies for guidance. Instead, Thaler and Sunstein edge closer to
Chicago School theories of human capital, for if individuals can be
nudged to make the right decisions, they can, as a result, increase the
value of their own stock.
Viewed in this way, the nudge agenda is less a form of ‘post-neoliberal-
ism’ than a new, hybrid form of neoliberalism that draws from, but at the
same time transcends, the trajectories of neoliberal reason outlined by
Foucault in his biopolitics lectures. It offers something new from previ-
ous and existing forms of neoliberalism as it does not centre explicitly on
the marketization of the state (although behavioural insights have clearly
applied to state activities under the rationale of making them more cost-
effective), as in ordoliberalism, or on the building of institutions such as
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trade organizations (Slobodian, 2018). Rather, the purpose of nudge
economics is to address the market deficiencies of individual consumers
by developing new forms of behavioural governance. When Wendy
Brown speaks of neoliberal ‘techniques of governance’ that operate
through forms of ‘soft power’ (2015: 35), Nudge is crucial as it works
by addressing the subjective ‘internalities’ that neither state coercion nor
market forces, for Thaler and Sunstein, are able to correct. As John
McMahon writes: ‘Behavioural economics. . . seeks not to challenge or
defy the market but to provide tweaks so as to better assimilate all to the
market; it captures the irrationality of economic actors and disciplines
that irrationality to the functioning of the market’ (2015: 146). The nudge
agenda can be understood as the latest incarnation of the neoliberal
project: one that draws partly from libertarian free-market individualism
and partly from a neo-conservative commitment to paternalism, and
which, seemingly unbeknownst to itself, both builds upon and rejects
ideas from previous Austrian, German and North American trajectories
of neoliberalism. This form of neoliberalism is concerned with the fail-
ures of human subjects and of governments, and how these can be gov-
erned and potentially corrected to be better market actors through the
application of behavioural understandings and principles. Nudge eco-
nomics, in the form expressed by Thaler and Sunstein, is, then, not just
a technical exercise aimed at providing individuals with better means for
pursuing goals of their choosing; it is fundamentally a political project.
This project is guided by an ideal of libertarian paternalism that treats
individual market freedom as the basis of all freedom, and which
bypasses concern for the structural inequalities – be these of class,
gender, or race – of contemporary capitalist society by shifting attention
to what are seen as the irrational and misguided choices of individuals.
This means, as a consequence, that in an age in which nudge economics is
flourishing, such inequalities continue to thrive, not least because,
increasingly, these inequalities are individualized and are dealt with in
terms of their effects rather than by confronting and addressing their
underlying causes.
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